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1. Introduction
In this article we analyze the evolution of official
discourses on political representation by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949 up to the present
day. Over its 70 years of holding power, the CCP and
its discourse on representation have undergone a signif-
icant transformation. From the onset of World War II
and the civil war against the Nationalists, in a country
whose large rural population was extremely poor and il-
literate but which is now a rising world power—closer
to the century-old nationalist objectives of making China
rich and strong, with a strikingly unequal but, overall, a
healthier, better educated, more urbanized population—
the CCP has evolved into a massive Party claiming 90 mil-
lionmembers (6.4% of the Chinese population).With the
unofficial acceptance of entrepreneurs within the Party
even before it was officially authorizedwith the theory of
the Three Represents (put forward by former President
Jiang Zemin in 2000 and later added to the Constitution
in 2002, implying that the CCP represents (i) advanced
productive forces, (ii) orientations of advanced culture,
and (iii) the fundamental interests of the majority of the
Chinese people) and the active recruiting of intellectual
elites and talented students (80% of new members are
nowunder 35), the CCP has alsomoved away from the fo-
cus on revolution and class struggle and presented itself
as a reformist ruling Party (zhizheng dang) capable of rep-
resenting the interests of the Chinese people in times of
rapid change prompted by technological advancements.
In line with these profound socio-economic changes, the
CCP has been adjusting its claim to be representative of
the Chinese people.
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A key premise of our article is that official discourse
should be taken seriously. By official discourse, we mean
themost immediate form of political discourse, i.e., “text
and talk of professional politicians or political institu-
tions” that “have political functions and implications”
(Van Dijk, 1997, pp. 12, 14). The study of official dis-
courses is illuminating as it reveals the official way of
thinking, conceptual shifts and evolving aims. Political
discourse analysis involves looking at “how politicians
think, speak and write about [an issue] and how such dis-
course and cognition influence political action and hence
political structure” (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 42). The Chinese
official discourse should therefore neither be ignored as
mere propaganda nor simply seen as a description of re-
ality, but should be acknowledged asmoulding reality (Li,
2001), as performative and impactful. As Michel Sorace
wrote, “for the Chinese state, official discourse and ter-
minology are notmerely descriptive; they are alsomeant
to be exemplary and normative, authoritative and bind-
ing” (Sorace, 2017, p. 7). As a result, we agree with him
that “framing the problem of ideology as a question of
belief misses how it functions as an assemblage of prac-
tices that shape people’s everyday habits of speech and
dispositions” (Sorace, 2017, p. 10). In this article, we an-
alyze official discourses attributed to former and current
political leaders and which we have identified as explic-
itly or implicitly focusing on representation. As they are
canonical speeches, they can easily be found in collected
speeches in print or online.
For analytical purposes, we adopt the perspective
of the constructivist turn in the theory of political rep-
resentation. After Hanna Pitkin published The Concept
of Representation in 1967, where she posits the exis-
tence of a stable meaning of the concept of represen-
tation and the equivalence of political representation
with electoral politics, a certain consensus about po-
litical representation in English and American political
theory emerged (Pitkin, 1972, p. 209). She identifies
four different forms of representation: descriptive, sym-
bolic, formalistic and substantive. Some authors have
recently challenged the description of political repre-
sentation as a simple principal-agent relationship be-
tween a pre-existing constituency and an elected legis-
lator acting independently but responsively to its con-
stituents, and have enriched the discussion of political
representation with new themes (Urbinati & Warren,
2008). What has been called the “constructivist turn”
of political representation (Disch, 2011; Mulieri, 2013;
Saward, 2010) focuses on the performative role of rep-
resentation (what it does rather than simply what it is).
Our article aligns with Saward’s argument that the inter-
ests and identities of the representatives and the rep-
resented are not fixed prior to the act of representa-
tion, but are constructed through representation (Disch,
2011; Näsström, 2011, p. 506; Saward, 2010). He argues
that the focus on electoral forms of representation fails
to account for diversified representative claims, which
are not onlymade by elected legislators.With these non-
electoral political practices, spokespersons and different
forms of delegation and embodiment emerge.1 This con-
stitutive processmanifests through representative claim-
making: “a claim to represent or to know what repre-
sents the interests of someone or something” (Saward,
2010, p. 305).
To focus on the CCP’s representative claims, we find
it fruitful to also proceed from the typology of represen-
tation developed by Yves Sintomer and inspired by the
work of Hasso Hoffman. It encourages us to go beyond
the “deceptive familiarity” of representation and its oc-
currences in English and Romance languages (Sintomer,
2013). According to Sintomer, representation can first be
divided into two categories: political-legal and symbolic.
Within the category of political-legal representation, the
most conventional meaning is mandate representation
(acting for), but it also has the meaning of identity repre-
sentation or embodiment (acting as).2 In the framework
of embodiment representation, the explicit expression of
consent, delegation or further screening from the repre-
sented to authorize the representative to speak and act
on their behalf is not required. In fact, the representation
relationship is supposed to be based on an immediate
community of interests, opinions, beliefs and often iden-
tity between the representative and the represented.
Taking identity representation into consideration is cru-
cial when studying the CCP’s claims to represent, as it al-
lows us to understand its claim to political-legal represen-
tation despite the absence of direct elections of top lead-
ers. As to symbolic representation, it cannot only take
the form of making an absent present (figuration) but
also implies the exhibition of a presence, an aspectwhich
Pitkin overlooked (Sintomer, 2013). To complete this ty-
pology, Sintomer also highlights the difference between
representation as distinction and descriptive representa-
tion (Bourdieu, 2001; Gaxie, 1978; Sintomer, 2013, in ref-
erence to Manin, 1997), which cuts across the divide be-
tween symbolic and legal-juridical conceptions of repre-
sentation. When representation is conceived as distinc-
tion, famously illustrated by Madison (Rossiter, 1961) or
Sieyes (1789), representatives are expected to be more
capable, wiser and more civic-oriented than the repre-
sented. In contrast, when representation is conceived as
descriptive, there is a demand for similarity between the
represented and the representatives, whomust “mirror”
(look like) the former.
1 Even though Saward (2010) and De Wilde (2013) only focus on claim-making in democratic contexts, extending this approach to non-democratic cases
is acceptable as long as the focus does not switch to the reception of these claims.
2 As Sintomer (2013) has shown, this last sense of representation is too often overlooked in the theory of representation (including in Pitkin) despite
the fact that assimilating the parts to the whole (pars pro toto) was a recurrent conceptualization of representation in the European Middle Ages,
which has left its mark on more modern conceptualizations of political-legal representation. Indeed, it is blatantly present in the case of charismatic
leaders, whether monarchical, self-appointed or democratically elected, but also in some conceptions of parliament (Burke, 1949) and even in radical
democratic experiments like the Occupy movement (with the famous slogan “We are the 99%”).
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Figure 1 summarizes the typology of political repre-
sentation offered by Sintomer.
As presented in the figure, distinction, description
and substantive forms are individual categories that are
applicable to the realization of both political-legal and
symbolic representation. It is thus possible, for example,
that symbolic representation is manifested through dis-
tinction to achieve the substantive effect of representing.
Different combinations are therefore possible. It must be
also noted that these are ideal types thatmay often over-
lap in real politics. This being said, we consider this typol-
ogy to be useful for deconstructing and analyzing differ-
ent nuances and forms of representative claims.
We break down selected texts into the components
from Saward’s model of claim-making, as in the follow-
ing example: “A Maker (M) puts forward a Subject (S)
which stands for anObject (O) that is related to a referent
(R), e.g., content of representation and is finally offered
to an Audience (A)” for tracing and analyzing the evolu-
tion of the CCP’s representative claim-making over sev-
eral decades. In the discourse we study, we find that on
the one hand the claim-maker (M), the CCP, has been po-
sitioning itself as the sole representative (the subject (S)
of representation) of the interests of the Chinese peo-
ple (object (O)), often by suppressing alternative rep-
resentative claims. Under the influence of Lenin’s van-
guard Party concept, the CCP combined representative
claims pertaining to both political-legal (identity) and
symbolic representation, with alternative claims of de-
scriptive distinction representation and above all sub-
stantive representation.
On the other hand, the CCP has been adjusting its
claims of representation to the rapidly changing realities
and trying to improve its capacity to respond to the in-
terests of the people. At the turn of the millennium, the
official discourse becomes more openly elitist and tech-
nocratic to improve substantive representation (perfor-
mance). Another object of the representative claim sur-
faces, namely the nation (which should be richer and
stronger), but it tallies with the still prevalent claim to
represent all the Chinese people. To make the elitist evo-
lution acceptable, the traditional Maoist method of the
mass line (the mass line—qunzhong luxian in Chinese—
is the guiding method, formulated by Mao Zedong in
1943, of consulting the masses, collecting their opinions
and eventually formulating them into state policies) is
updated on the basis of diverse forms of consultation.
While the discourse on consultation of the masses has
always been present, it has intensified and these devices
compensate, at least symbolically, for the more explicit
guardianship discourse (representation as distinction).
Consultation is related not only to symbolic but also to
substantive representation as a convenient way to iden-
tify the urgent problems that need solving and thereby
maintain the image of the Party as the best representa-
tive of the Chinese people’s and the nation’s interests.
The article consists of five parts. Following the
Introduction, we outline the dynamics of representative
claim-making in authoritarian China. We then focus on
discourses on the CCP’s continuous but evolving hege-
monic claim to represent the Chinese people over five
generations of leaders. In the fourth part, we discuss
the implications of the new information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs) and digitalization for political
representation in China. We summarize our findings in
the conclusion.
2. The Dynamics of Representative Claim-Making
in China
Despite the existence of various formal and informal, top-
down and bottom-up channels for interest expression in
China (Heberer, 2016), the Chinese context is character-
ized by the prevalence of the CCP’s persistent hegemonic
claim—since the proclamation of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949 and throughout the five generations of
the CCP leadership—to represent the fundamental inter-
ests of the majority of the Chinese people.
As the sole representative of the majority of the peo-
ple, the CCP performs three main tasks. First, it is ex-
pected to respond to people’s needs.Mao’s famous 1944
slogan “Serve the people” (wei renmin fuwu) is still one
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Figure 1. Categories of political representation. Source: The authors.
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of the Party’s main claims and Xi recently stated that
“wholeheartedly serving the people has been always the
fundamental goal of the Party and the main reason why
our Party is supported and loved by the people” (Renmin
Ribao, 2015). This can be interpreted as a substantive rep-
resentative claim, as, according to Hannah Pitkin’s def-
inition, representation is a “substantive acting for oth-
ers” and “acting in the interest of the represented, in a
manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 209). The
Party has therefore striven to legitimize itself through
depicting itself as a better representative of people’s
interests than conventional elected representatives in
the West (in “formal democracies”) because of the sub-
stantive representation (and therefore supposed “sub-
stantive democracy”) it achieves (Frenkiel, 2015) through
the delivery of a long-term perspective and tangible re-
sults, like military victories, women’s liberation and col-
lectivization in its first period and after Mao’s death, eco-
nomic performance, poverty alleviation, “small prosper-
ity” (xiaokang), infrastructure building, regaining power
on the international scene, becoming an innovative na-
tion and so on.
In connection with these objectives and achieve-
ments, the Party’s second task is to identify core national
interests, which are formulated in major speeches and
reports (five-year plans, Party congress reports). Thirdly,
given the pluralization of society and of interests result-
ing from the growing gap between those who have bene-
fitedmost from the Reform and Opening Policy launched
in 1978 and the others, the CCP acts as a coordinator of
various and often conflicting interests of different social
groups with the main goal of maintaining social stabil-
ity (weiwen). This goal has been blatantly officialized un-
der Hu Jintao’s “building a harmonious society” (jianshe
hexie shehui) slogan. Social stability and subordination of
individual interests to collective national interests have
been the fundamentals of the CCP’s vision of political rep-
resentation. However, with the Party’s transformation
to a ruling Party, forsaking class struggle, conflictuality
has been gradually erased and politics conceived as a se-
ries of problems needing to be identified, then solved
consensually and scientifically (as illustrated by slogans
such as “scientific socialism” and “scientific governance”)
by a well-trained technocratic elite (Li, 2009) selected
through meritocratic principles (Bell, 2015; Gore, 2019),
and surrounded by the best experts (Frenkiel, 2015). In
this apoliticized conception of politics, the CCP depicts it-
self as a neutral arbiter, never defending its own interests
but only the people’s and the nation’s (He & Yao, 2011).
In other words, as Demin Duan (2019) writes in an article
on the CCP’s representative turn from vanguard to repre-
sentative published in this special issue, with the theory
of the Three Represents, the CCP shifts from a revolution-
ary vanguard conception of representation (letting peo-
ple be aware of their own historical mission and be able
to rule themselves) to a more technocratic and elitist un-
derstanding of representation that places the represen-
tatives above the represented.
3. The Evolution of the CCP’s Hegemonic Claim from
Mao to Xi (1949–2019)
In official discourse, the focus is put on substantive rep-
resentation, as representation is often defined as the ca-
pacity to be responsive and responsible. To display rep-
resentativeness (the capacity to represent the majority),
the Party-state must demonstrate its responsiveness to
and responsibility for the needs and interests of the peo-
ple. The evolution of the discourse on the mass line is a
case in point; so too are the current official discourses
on digitalization.
The traditional conception of representation by the
CCP derives from Lenin’s conception of the Party as the
vanguard of the working class. Mao innovated by includ-
ing the peasants, whom he tended to glorify, in the rev-
olution and recruited them to political offices after 1949.
The vanguard role assumed by the Leninist Party rests
upon two assumptions: first, that a single Party is capa-
ble of representing the interests of the working class as
a whole without a critical opposition to help it avoid and
correct omissions, inaccuracies and mistakes; and, sec-
ond, that the vanguard is capable of speaking in a single,
united voice for those it claims to represent, in the ab-
sence of competition (Geras, 1981; Thornton, 2016).
Even though the word daibiao (represent) does not
appear in Mao’s speeches theorizing the mass line, this
theory helps us understand how the Leninist concept of
representation by the vanguard Party was applied to the
Chinese context. Mass line theory (qunzhong luxian) was
first formally expounded inwar times in “Somequestions
concerning methods of leadership”, a resolution written
byMao and adopted by the Central Committee on 1 June
1943. The resolution formalizes practices which commu-
nists had more or less consciously adopted for the lead-
ership (cadres) to connect with the masses. Mao con-
sidered the mass line as one of the main work meth-
ods of the Party, based on the principle described as
“all for the masses, all depend on the masses, from the
masses and among the masses” (yiqie weile qunzhong,
yiqie yikao qunzhong, cong qunzhong zhonglai, dao
qunzhong zhongqu). Specifically, this method consists
in ensuring that leaders are never “cut off from the
masses” and constantly reconnect with them through
three main functions: collecting and distilling popu-
lar perceptions/interests, avoiding bureaucratism and
elitism, and educating the masses for them to finally no
longer need leaders when they become fully capable of
ruling themselves. The mass line is therefore based on
the absence of a presumption of ordinary citizens’ per-
sonal autonomy.
The mass line was also explicitly presented in a
speech entitled “Organize!” that Mao gave on 19
November 1943 in which he forbids senior cadres and
militaries to be cut off from the masses. The idea con-
veyed in that speech is similar to Liang Qichao’s idea
at the end of the 19th century to tap into the Chinese
people’s will and formidable latent energy to strengthen
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the nation. Mao uses the image of Zhuge Liang (one
of the most brilliant strategists in Chinese history, who
lived during the Three Kingdoms period), whose like can
supposedly be found in every Chinese village, to con-
vey a non-elitist conception of the people’s capacities.
Through education and propaganda, leaders impose poli-
cies that they derive from the needs that the masses
themselves express, albeit confusingly. With the mass
line, Party cadres are to promote policies put forward by
a vanguard Party whose distinction and wisdom are ur-
gently needed to transform and distil amorphous public
opinion into policies benefiting the Chinese people in the
long run. Even though Mao emphasized democracy, im-
plicitly, it seems that we are close to what Robert Dahl
called the “guardianship discourse” (Dahl, 1989) in the
sense that only an especially qualified elite can govern
for the common good (Manion, 2015, p. 86). Mao, how-
ever, insists on the right proportion of responsiveness
necessary for this representation to be substantive and
not just symbolic (Frakt, 1979). The representatives are
supposed to sincerely listen and learn from ordinary cit-
izens, respond to them and translate their raw opinions
into political decisions. The Party line is dictated neither
by the people nor the Party cadres, who are merely mes-
sengers because, as Hanna Pitkin wrote on the interme-
diary spectrum of representation, “a man who merely
consults and reflects without acting is not representing
in the sense of substantively acting for others” (Pitkin,
1972, p. 211). The traditional vanguard Party conception,
which is central to the CCP’s representative claim and
its application in the mass line, therefore combines iden-
tity representation, descriptive representation and rep-
resentation as distinction (Sintomer, 2013). The Party is
not a separate caste outside of the people but rather
a pars pro toto. The mass line and the vanguard Party
are therefore framed as democratic. Party cadres are se-
lected among and act as the working class and the peas-
ants (identity representation) and are like them (descrip-
tive representation). They are not an aristocratic elite,
but are nevertheless presented as more capable than or-
dinary citizens, speaking both like them and better than
them (distinction).
Deng Xiaoping further maintained that the interests
of the people should be placed above everything else
and suggested four criteria (in the formof questions) that
determine a policy’s success: Is the policy approved by
the people? Is it supported by the people? Does it make
people happy? Do the people promise to endorse it?
(Renmin Ribao, 2014). This, at least in theory, suggests an
active role for the people in legitimizing the CCP’s func-
tion as the sole representative. Deng further pointed out:
What’s good about having the multi-Party system of
capitalist countries? Themulti-Party system is a result
of the mutual struggle among bourgeois groups that
can never represent the interests of the vast working
masses of the people. There are multiple parties in
our country too, but they all serve the socialist cause
under the premise of acceptance of the CCP’s leader-
ship. (Zhong, 2009)
Both Mao and Deng viewed representation of the col-
lective interests of the people as a fundamental mission
of the Party and its representative capacity as an essen-
tial guarantor of social justice and stability. The CCP as
the main and the only representative also sought vali-
dation from the people. At least in theory, the people
could approve or disapprove the policies by streaming
their voices through carefully designed and managed of-
ficial channels. The mass line pertains to this process.
The administration of letters and visits (xinfang) created
in 1951 has also been “responsible for receiving, regis-
tering, and forwarding testimonies and requests to the
concerned parties” (Hua & Thireau, 2010) and has pro-
vided a fundamental mechanism at all administrative
levels for a wide range of individuals and groups to ex-
pose injustices, embezzlement, or the faulty application
of administrative procedures. It was the sole channel for
the Chinese people to voice their discontent until the
1980s, and is still used by people to this day. The digi-
talization of the bureaus (especially with the creation of
websites and accounts on social media) has greatly facil-
itated access to their services. Finally, even though the
media are considered to be the mouthpiece of the CCP,
since 1987 and liberal-leaning Zhao Ziyang’s reference to
“control by the media” or watchdog journalism (yulun
jiandu) in the political report he delivered at the 13th
Party Congress, the idea of the media as compelling the
authorities to be more transparent and providing com-
munication channels between the Party and the people
has been present in official speeches, albeit in a more
or less toned down manner depending on the context
(Repnikova, 2018; Salmon, 2011).
This logic of representation was also maintained
in the post-Deng era. Jiang Zemin’s pivotal “Three
Represents” theory, ratified at the 16th Party Congress
in 2002, is the leading example of the CCP’s adaptability
to the new realities and new challenges for representa-
tion. Since the Reform and Opening Policy was launched
in 1978, Chinese society had transformed and diversified,
with new social groups emerging and demanding that
their voices are heard and interests addressed. Rather
than suppressing new demands for representation and
provoking social dissatisfaction and unrest, the CCP ab-
sorbed and integrated them into its own system. With
the Three Represents, the object of representation (O),
the people who the CCP is supposed to represent, no
longer refers only to the working class and the peasantry
but also includes capitalists, which is a major change in
discourse (even though in practice, changes occurred be-
fore the theory was announced). By absorbing the new
(elite) representative social forces, the CCP successfully
preserved its status as a hegemonic representative of
the interests of the majority of people. Thus, the capac-
ity to represent the majority has been seen by the CCP
top leadership as the source of the Party’s legitimacy, sur-
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vival and continuity. For example, in one of his speeches
in 2000 Jiang Zemin stated:
The reason our Party enjoys the people’s support
is that throughout the historical periods of revolu-
tion, construction and reform, it has always repre-
sented the development trend of China’s advanced
productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced
culture, and the fundamental interests of the over-
whelming majority of the Chinese people. (China
Daily, 2010)
The so-called fundamental interests of the people in-
clude economic, cultural and political interests. By rep-
resenting “advanced productive forces”, the Party repre-
sents the economic interests of the people. By represent-
ing the orientation of advanced culture, the Party claims
to represent the cultural interests of the people (devel-
opment of creativity, mind and spirit). Finally and most
importantly, the Party also claims to represent the politi-
cal interests of the people by guaranteeing that the peo-
ple remain the true and the only master of the country
(renmin dangjia zuozhu).
In a similar vein, Hu Jintao emphasized:
Our Party is the Marxist ruling Party. All tasks and re-
sponsibilities of the Party are for the benefit of the
people’s interests. To represent the fundamental in-
terests of the majority of the people…has been con-
sistently the guiding thought of four generations of
leaders in our Party. (Wu, 2006)
As a result, since the Three Represents, the Party still con-
siders itself as a vanguard Party even though it no longer
claims to represent the proletariat alone but the whole
Chinese people and nation. As reflected in the revisions
to the Constitution adopted in November 2012 during
the 18th Party Congress:
The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both
of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese peo-
ple and the Chinese nation. It is the core of lead-
ership for the cause of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics and represents the development trend of
China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of
China’s advanced culture and the fundamental inter-
ests of the overwhelmingmajority of the Chinese peo-
ple. (Constitution of Communist Party of China, 2012)
The Party has metamorphosed and adapted to new do-
mestic and international social and economic conditions
(Shambaugh, 2008). In order to legitimize itself and to
curb its ideological crisis, the Party has sought to demon-
strate not only continuity but also its efforts to adapt to
changing contexts and reform. It strives to show itself as
the only possible guarantor of the country’s interests, de-
velopment and stability, while remaining in touch with so-
cial realities (Cabestan, 2014, p. 58). China’s economic and
diplomatic rise on the international stage has helped to le-
gitimize these claims while rising inequalities have weak-
ened them. The ubiquitous campaigns against corruption
and poverty are framed to counter the view that past re-
forms have not benefited the whole population equally
and that officials are cut off frompeople’s needs. They are
more or less explicitly reminiscent of the mass line.
Xi Jinping, for his part, has placed emphasis on im-
proving the formal institutions of political representa-
tion, such as people’s congresses and political consul-
tative conferences. In his speech at the 19th National
Congress of the CCP in 2017, in addition to drawing
attention to the traditional definition of people’s con-
gresses as organs of power (quanli jiguan), he stressed
that people’s congresses should better perform their rep-
resentative function and eventually become organs of
representation while maintaining a close connection to
the masses (Xi, 2017). Undoubtedly, the Chinese lead-
ership sees digitalization as one of the sources of im-
provement of its representative capacity. For example,
in 2016 Xi Jinping demanded that all Party and govern-
ment cadres should follow the people’s demands on-
line, should learn how to use the internet to hear the
needs of the people, collect “benign” opinions and sug-
gestions and respond to the concerns of the people
(Zhou, 2016). In June 2016, the Central Leading Group for
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, led by Xi Jinping,
adopted “Suggestions on improving implementation of
closer ties between theNational People’s Congress (NPC)
representatives and the masses”. The “Suggestions” re-
quire the establishment of new and well-functioning on-
line platforms for improving the connection between the
people andNPC representatives. The document also calls
for the establishment of multiple channels for people’s
representatives to express public opinions more effec-
tively (Wang, 2017).
Another interesting development that we have been
observing in China in recent years is personification
of representation or what Yves Sintomer labels em-
bodiment representation (Sintomer, 2013). From official
rhetoric, we can see that representation is presented to
the public as the major mission not only of the Party but
of the Party chief himself. Xi Jinping is often portrayed by
the state media as the true representative of the people
(renmin daibiao Xi Jinping) and the story of Xi’s rise from
the grassroots (his father was a senior general but the
family was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution) to
highest leadership level has arguably been depicted as
appealing to people. Official commentators have inter-
estingly framed the reason why Xi’s Thought has suppos-
edly become popular among the people in reference to
representation. His popularity is said to be mainly due
to his capacity to represent the needs of the people and
respond to their claims (Liang, 2018). Given the strict au-
thoritarian context, the popularity of the president and
the CCP’s claims are hard to verify. We can nonetheless
hypothesize, if confirmed, the efficiency of tightly con-
trolled communication and a drilled narrative presenting
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Xi as the saviour combining representation as distinction
and embodiment representation. He is presented as hav-
ing started from zero (during the Cultural Revolution), be-
ing a simple man (eating and talking simply) and know-
ing the common people (laobaixing) well, a strong and
seasoned but benevolent ruler (xi dada) willing to make
tough decisions to redress other officials’ lack of recti-
tude and responsiveness. This narrative frames Xi as the
embodiment of a strong and modern China, the right
ruler to lead China towards further modernization (hav-
ing been in charge of one of the most modern and devel-
oped province in the past) in the age of digitalization.
4. Digitalization and Political Representation
Speedy proliferation of the ICTs and particularly social
media in China stimulated the creation of online spaces
for bottom-up self-expression (Han, 2018b), online ac-
tivism and alternative opinions (deLisle, Avery, & Yang,
2016; Frenkiel & Wang, 2017; Yang, 2009; Zheng, 2007).
This also allowed different patterns of representation
and representative claim-making to emerge (Heberer &
Shpakovskaya, 2017, 2018). Since the introduction of
Weibo in 2009, the platform has become the largest and
most important space for public debate, including con-
testation of official discourses on representation in China.
In the past five years, however, the Party-state has been
consistently introducing tougher regulations and censor-
ship practices to monitor and control dissemination of
information and fake news and to guide public opinion,
thereby affecting the platform of most relevance to the
issue of claim-making. Weibo microblogging provided in-
tellectuals with an opportunity to publicly express their
individual opinions on the state of representation and
make claims relating to representation and misrepre-
sentation (Shpakovskaya, 2018). Popular microbloggers
are key opinion leaders who are followed by millions of
fans. Themost critical ones have been systematically cen-
sored and blocked by the authorities. Thus, we argue
that a previously freer online space that allowed public
debate on political representation and claim-making has
gradually become dominated by the Party-state that vigi-
lantly maintains its position as sole representative of the
Chinese people and their interests.
In the following passages, we demonstrate the dis-
course on the ICTs and digitalization that the CCP has
been promoting online and offline. More specifically,
our analysis of Xi Jinping’s official speeches from 2014
to 2018 shows that digitalization is often presented by
the leading authorities as both a prerequisite for de-
velopment and a potential source of social instability
and crisis. As the sole representative of the “people’s
fundamental interests” as well as of “new productive
forces” and “advanced culture”, as claimed in the Three
Represents, the CCP has been actively attempting to se-
cure the leading role in the process of modernization
through digitalization.
4.1. Digitalization as a Prerequisite for Socio-Economic
Development
The Party-led transformation of China into a digital super-
power (wangluo qiangguo), first proposed by Xi Jinping in
2014, had become, by 2018, one of the leading strategic
thoughts (zhanlve sixiang) of new development (xinxing
fazhan).3 In official speeches, digitalization and the new
ICTs are presented to the public as an unprecedented op-
portunity for promoting China’s rapid development. In
the most recent version of this well-established trend,
digitalization—according to Xi Jinping—“represents new
productive forces and the direction for new develop-
ment” (Renmin Ribao, 2018). First and foremost, digital-
ization is seen as an opportunity for economic growth
driven by technological innovations. Technological inno-
vation in artificial intelligence, big data management and
innovative initiatives by small and medium-sized busi-
nesses are thus all considered essential for the overall
economic modernization of the country.
Furthermore, a new notion of a “smart society”
(zhihui shehui) was put forward by Xi Jinping in 2018.
Deriving from the concept of the “smart city”, building a
“smart society” is the ultimate goal of digitalization. No
clear-cut definition has been yet spelt out; however, the
notion boils down to the general idea of an equal society
enabled by digital technologies. This equality, e.g., eq-
uitable economic development based on mutual aid be-
tween rich cities and poor countryside and equal access
to social welfare, can supposedly be reached by narrow-
ing down digital gaps between cities and villages and be-
tween different social groups (Shan, 2018). It is also em-
phasized that a “smart society” must manifest socialist
values and be appropriate for Chinese national specifici-
ties. The goal, then, is not simply to mimic foreign mod-
els: in a smart society, “individual interests must fuse
with national interests and priorities in order to achieve
the third millennium goal—the building of a smart soci-
ety with Chinese characteristics” (Li & Zhang, 2017).
In addition, Xi Jinping strongly encouraged govern-
ment officials and people’s congress deputies to revive
the traditional mass line by actively engaging with the
public online. At the Work Symposium on Cybersecurity
and Informatization in 2016, for instance, he demanded
that in the spirit of the mass line, all Party and govern-
ment cadres should follow the people’s demands online.
Xi stressed that:
Netizens come from the people; when people go on-
line, their will and expectations also go online. Our
leading cadres should follow the people. Party cadres
should learn how to exercise the mass line on the in-
3 The concept of “a digital or cyber superpower” was first proposed in 2014. Later, in 2015, the concept was further developed in the Internet Plus Action
Plan proposed by the central government. In 2018, Xi Jinping put forward the concept of “Strategic Thought on Cyber Superpower” (wangluo qiangguo
zhanlve sixiang), which is considered a further theoretical development of the framework for cyberspace governance and cybersecurity in China.
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ternet. They should often go online, learn what peo-
ple think and want, collect good thoughts and opin-
ions and actively respond to the people’s concerns
and doubts. Let the internet become a new chan-
nel for understanding and listening to the masses,
for solving the problems of the masses, for nurtur-
ing democracy and for subjecting ourselves to super-
vision by the people. (Renmin Ribao, 2016)
The above extracts have two important implications. On
the one hand, the Party-state has been actively adapting
to the changing environment stimulated by the ICTs. By
appropriating the ICTs for better and more efficient so-
cial service provision, the CCP aims to recreate and reem-
phasize its image and function as the sole representa-
tive of the people. By promoting the idea of the digital
mass line, the CCP aims to enhance its bond with the
people by demonstrating its closeness to the hearts and
minds of the people through the use of ICTs. This may be
interpreted as a form of mixed symbolic representation
combining descriptive representation and politics of pres-
ence where the CCP acts as a representative that demon-
strates similarities with and closeness to the represented.
E-governancemay potentially contribute to the CCP’s
ability to better identify and respond to the interests of
the people and thus improve its capacity for substan-
tive representation. On the other hand, the consistent
reference to conventional notions such as the mass line
and Party’s leadership also suggests that the CCP adheres
to the idea of consultation and responsiveness as parts
of representation through channels that are tightly con-
trolled by the CCP and that it has no intention of weak-
ening its monopoly over representation.
4.2. Digitalization as a Source of Instability and Risk
Digitalization and new ICTs are not only depicted as the
driving force for socio-economic modernization and de-
velopment, but are also highly associated with instabil-
ity and crises. In the official discourse, they are often
presented as a source of digital crime, fraud, falsified
information, pornography and potential cause of chaos.
Therefore, the greatest attention has been paid to pre-
serving cybersecurity. Moreover, cybersecurity is contin-
uously equated with state security and directly linked to
the interests of the people that the CCP is to represent.
Xi Jinping emphasized that “without a secure cyberspace,
there can be no secure state or stable economy, and
the interests of the overwhelming majority of the peo-
ple thus cannot be guaranteed” (Renmin Ribao, 2018).
Most importantly, the Party defines cyberspace se-
curity and management as its foremost responsibility to
the nation and the people: “We must strengthen our
cyberspace governance in accordance with the law and
with an attitude responsible to the society and the peo-
ple” (Cyberspace Administration of China, 2016).
In addition to cybersecurity, another notable devel-
opment is the call to actively create a safe and posi-
tive online ecology. The cyberspace is often criticized
by authorities for being too negative (link with previ-
ous quote’s “good opinions”) and aggressive. This nega-
tivity and aggression are considered unhealthy and are
thus in conflict with the interests of the netizens, par-
ticularly the younger internet users. The internet should
therefore be cleaned up by spreading positive energy
(zhengnengliang):
It is necessary to enhance the construction of online
content, its positive propagation online, also to nur-
ture a positive and healthy online culture that encour-
ages aspirations toward improvement and goodness.
It is necessary to nourish the people’s hearts and soci-
ety with core socialist values and outstanding achieve-
ments of human culture. It is important to ensure
abundance of positivity in order to create for the inter-
net users, and young users in particular, a cyberspace
that is clean and healthy. (Cyberspace Administration
of China, 2016)
To fulfil its responsibility as the main guarantor of
cybersecurity and positive online ecology, the Party-
state has made efforts aimed at (1) regaining its cen-
tral presence in the cyberspace by establishing official
platforms for dissemination of official narratives and
online communication with the people (King, Pan, &
Roberts, 2017); (2) building up a professional team of cy-
berspace managers; (3) improving the regulatory frame-
work; and (4) tightening online censorship and enacting
self-censorship (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). Most no-
tably, as some researchers have shown, the creation of
a positive and ideologically correct online environment
is not only a product of tightening censorship and co-
ercion, but is also a result of persuasion (Repnikova &
Fang, 2018), negotiation (Jiang, 2016), and active online
engagement of pro-regime netizens (Han, 2018a) and na-
tionalists (Schneider, 2018).
From the representation perspective, the CCP cer-
tainly positions itself as the sole capable representative
of the people’s interests, e.g., it is the CCP that possesses
the necessary capacity to deal with the emerging dan-
ger brought about by digitalization. It claims to be the
guarantor of safety and order. That is in line with repre-
sentation as distinction, discussed above, and with sub-
stantive representation. To achieve its goal of being the
sole representative, the CCP has been suppressing alter-
native claim-makers, such as outspoken bloggers, in the
name of a safe and stable online environment. At the
same time, however, the CCP has been actively penetrat-
ing the internet by establishing a wide net of websites
for e-governance aimed at better social service provision
through consultation.
5. Conclusions
To better understand the nature of political claim-
making, we used Yves Sintomer’s ideal types to go be-
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yond the “deceptive familiarity” of representation and
its occurrences and analyze the official conceptualization
of representation in China in light of this typology. We
have seen that his concept of embodiment representa-
tion (acting as) allows us not only to approach the CCP’s
representative claims in terms of symbolic representa-
tion (descriptive representation and politics of presence)
and substantive representation (acting for), but also to
grasp its political-legal dimension despite the absence of
direct elections of top leaders.
Applying discourse analysis, we examined the evolu-
tion of the CCP’s representative claim-making since 1949
to the present day and draw the following conclusions.
First, there has been a continuous upgrading in concep-
tualization of representation and expression of represen-
tative claims by the CCP leaders. This is revealed in the
Three Represents, as well as in the recent speeches of
Xi Jinping. Not only has the CCP diversified the formula-
tion of who it represents (the object of representation),
but it has also raised the significance of representation
by referring to representation as the Party’s duty and
responsibility, aimed at improving its capacity to repre-
sent substantively. More specifically, we showed that in
the Chinese official discourse, the focus has gradually
been put on substantive representation as the CCP has
often presented itself as a performance-driven Party act-
ing in a responsive way. To display representativeness
(the capacity to represent the majority), the Party-state
must demonstrate its responsiveness to and responsibil-
ity for the needs and interests of the people. In pursu-
ing this aim under Mao, the CCP tended to employ both
the elements of representation as distinction and de-
scription. After the Three Represents and its elitist turn,
claims of symbolic representation have been more vig-
orously combined with claims of substantive as well as
identity representation. Our analysis of the evolution of
the discourse on the mass line and the current official
discourses on digitalization both exemplify this dynamic.
Since the Party leadership has gradually considered the
interests of the Chinese people as more diverse and less
objective, it has indeed presented itself as a neutral ar-
biter and relied more extensively on popular consulta-
tion, without yielding anything of its claim to represent,
which is in line with Pitkin’s emphasis on the role of con-
sultation in substantive representation.
Secondly, alongside changes in discourse, we also
trace continuity. We contend that over decades, political
representation has invariably been perceived by the CCP
as the capacity to represent the interests of the major-
ity of the Chinese people. Most importantly, the CCP has
been positioning itself as the sole representative of the
Chinese people. In the age of fast proliferation of the new
ICTs, the CCP has adjusted its discourse on digitalization
by presenting it as both a prerequisite for development
and a source of chaos. That is how the CCP attempts to
justify its increasing control over the internet: it is sup-
posedly the duty of the sole representative to maintain
stability and make the most of the use of new technolo-
gies in the interests of the Chinese people and the na-
tion.We argued that to fulfil its responsibility as themain
guarantor of cybersecurity and positive online ecology,
the Party-state has enhanced its online visibility as well
as tightened its control over alternative claim-makers
that emerged online. We thus conclude that alongside
improving the CCP’s governing capacity and substantive
representation with the use of digital technologies, the
conventional representation dynamics, where the CCP
has been maintaining its monopoly over representation,
remains predominant.
To sum up, over past decades the CCP has been
adjusting its representative claim to the rapid socio-
economic transformations reshaping the country by
moving from the Leninist and Marxist ideals of repre-
sentation of workers and peasants in the continuous
class struggle and positioning itself as a Party that rep-
resents the interests of the Chinese people and the fu-
ture of the nation. We demonstrated how the CCP has
embraced various strategies over the decades, empha-
sizing elements of political-legal (mandate and embodi-
ment) and symbolic representation as well as distinction
and description representation. We also highlighted a
shift in the focus of representation from symbolic to sub-
stantive, mainly through digitalization of the mass line
and consultation. Finally, we showed how social media
in China have provided a platform for bottom-up claims
on representation and misrepresentation. By promoting
itself as the sole capable representative of the national
interests and guarantor of security in the digital age,
the CCP attempts to legitimize its intolerance towards al-
ternative claim-makers and preserve its hegemony over
claim-making.
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